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Large Firms and Soft Budget Constraints for Transition 
Economies 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Whilst the adverse effect of soft budget constraints (SBCs) is politically and 
theoretically recognised in transition economies, there is a lack of empirical 
investigation of SBCs to determine the extent of the bearing on the economy.  This 
article empirically examines the impact of SBCs on investment for large firms in six 
new European Union (EU) member states.  The conventional investment model is 
challenged by augmenting the model with the variable of ‘bank loans’ as a proxy to 
capture the impact of SBCs.  The panel estimation reveals that there is a clear 
indication of SBCs for the Czech Republic and Poland, whereas for Hungary and the 
Baltic countries, the operation of SBCs seems to be weak.  It is also found that such 
factors as joining the EU and financial development mitigate the practice of SBCs.  
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1. Introduction 
The transition economies were, in general, known for soft budget constraints (SBCs).  
SBCs imply that government or financial institutions are willing to provide additional 
resources to firms, or to bail them out (Kornai, 1992 and Lízal and Svejnar 2002).  If 
firms take advantage of SBCs, there is a risk that the funds might be used inefficiently 
or for survival rather than for viable investment.  The operation of SBCs tends to 
favour former large state-owned firms, and this causes credit crunches for smaller 
firms or new firms, which may face expensive bank loans or are denied access to the 
loans altogether (Lizal and Svejnar 2002).   
 Evidence indicates that soft budget constraints remain into later stages of 
transition: although direct government subsidies have been substantially decreased, 
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indirect subsidies through banks or tax arrears continue to exist on a large scale (Lízal 
and Svejnar 2002 and Konings et al. 2003).  It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
transition countries are prone to excessive government deficits, building up high 
levels of public debt.  Other detrimental impacts on the economy include excess 
demand for labour and other resources, lack of fiscal consolidation, financial bubbles 
and lack of R & D (Kornai 2001 and Brücker et al 2005).   
 This paper empirically investigates the effect of SBCs on investment 
behaviour for large firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania. Data used are the firm level panel data over a relatively long time span 
from 1995 to 2006.  The paper is one of the few empirical works on SBCs for the 
Central Eastern European Countries.  Since the seminal work by Kornai (1979, 1980), 
who attributes the practice of SBCs to government paternalism, a certain amount of 
literature has been published, albeit mostly from the aspect of political economy, e.g. 
Hillman et al. (1987) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that governments allow 
SBCs in order to gain public support or to avoid unemployment, whereas Dewatripont 
and Maskin (1995) investigated a problem of governments’ unintended behaviour 
from the initial commitment to  not bail out firms.  Empirical literature which deals 
with the direct impact on investment is very limited.  Exceptions include that of Lízal 
and Svejnar (2002) over the sample period from 1992-1998 for the Czech Republic, 
and Konings et al. (2003) with a time horizon of 1994-1999 for Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria and Romania.  Both are based on accelerator theory using panel 
data.  Mueller and Peev (2007) also examined SBCs for the transition economies 
using aggregate macroeconomic data, pooling twenty-six transition countries during 
the period from 1989-2002.     
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 Investment literature for developing economies frequently involves measuring 
the impact of cash sensitivity on investment with the cash flow as a proxy to capture 
the financial constraints.  This is based on an assumption that a firm is financially 
constrained if an increase in the supply of internal funds results in a higher level of 
investment spending.  In the study of Jaramillo et al. (1996), Günçavdi et al. (1998) 
and Gelos and Werner (2002), the Euler model is utilised, whereas  Konings et al. 
(2003), Koo and Maeng (2005) and Bhaduri (2005) adopted the Q model.  In many 
cases, the authors tend to find significant cash flow sensitivity in investment decisions 
for developing economies, and a structural shift is often observed as represented by a 
lower cash sensitivity of investment in the post financial reform period.   
 We derive an investment model by drawing on both the Q and Euler models.  
The problem is to find an appropriate proxy variable to measure the extent of SBCs in 
empirical analysis.  In the work of Brücker et al (2005), SBCs are measured by the 
degree of labour productivity, arguing that labour hoarding is one of the key features 
of a SBCs syndrome producing more labour intensity (Kornai 1979, 1980, Hillman et 
al 1987)1.  There is, however, a limitation to this approximation in applying it to 
Central Eastern European countries (CEEC).  When they paved the way towards 
membership of the EU, among other things, the increase of foreign capital from the 
old EU should have substantially affected the economies of the new EU member 
states.  For example, FDI consists of management skill, know-how and technology, 
and that FDI generates technological diffusion to these transition economies raising 
economic growth.  In this respect, regardless of the presence of SBCs, it is 
conceivable that there is a large shift in productivity in the post-entry period.  In the 
                                                 
1 Kornai (1979, 1980) argues that excess demand for labour is one of the key features of the SBCs.  
See also Hillman et al (1987) and Brücker et al (2005).  Goldfeld and Quandt (1988, 1990) demonstrate 
that SBCs increase factor demand.   
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study of Lízal and Svejnar (2002),  Konings et al. (2003) and Mueller and Peev 
(2007), all with the same mission of investigating SBCs, the principle variable to 
measure the SBCs is the profit or cash flow with the assumption that if firms enjoy 
SBCs, the sensitivity of investment to cash flows or internal funds should be 
insignificant.  This, too, has a downside, as cash flow may be correlated with 
investment for other reasons than financial constraints, for example, the current level 
of cash flow predicts future profitability of firms (Gelos and Werner, 2002 and 
Bhaduri 2005).  Also one of the main theories that dominate the capital structure 
debate is the pecking order theory, where firms have a hierarchy of capital 
preferences.  Such that, if firms are sensitive to cash flows, it could be due to future 
prospects of profitability or a preference for using internal funds for investment, not 
necessarily due to financial constraints.   
 A number of different definitions of the SBCs have been discussed in 
literature associated with subsidy, trade credit, tax arrears, wage arears and bank loans 
(Schaffer 1998)2.  In this paper, the banking system is considered to be a key route by 
which budget constraints are softened, where there are directed (state) credits, which 
often go to politically powerful firms.  Evidence on whether banks provide funds to 
firms under the provision of SBCs is, however, less straightforward, since it is  
difficult to interpret the increases in loans observed in the transition economies3.  Yet, 
a large and growing volume of debt classified as ‘bad’ by banks in transition 
economies may verify the presence of SBCs through this channel.  Moreover, at the 
                                                 
2 It is noted that total trade credit and overdue trade credit in transition economies are in fact no larger 
than those  in developed Western economics (see Table 1, p.89 Schaeffer 1998).  Also, a real flow of 
tax arrears is in the order of a relatively low 1 to 3% of GDP per annum as compared with Russia 
where the real flow of tax arrears in 1996 was around 7% of GDP. 
 
3 For example, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) find that the existence of sunk costs in existing loans 
may give rise to soft budget constraints, though banks are subject to hard budget constraints.  Berglöf 
and Roland (1997) argue that new lending hardens budget constraints when the average quality of 
investment projects is high, whereas refinancing of old loans crowds out new finance, giving rise to 
SBCs, causing credit crunches on new loans. 
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start of the transition period, independent commercial banks were created from a 
former monobank system, and the newly established banks had, in effect, little 
capability of appraising projects, meanwhile some were under government control for 
continuous credit to existing client firms (Lizal and Svejnar 2002)4.  On the basis of 
this, the empirical focus is on bank loans in measuring SBCs, and the conventional 
investment model is challenged by augmenting the model with the variable of ‘credit’ 
as a proxy to capture the impact of SBCs on investment.   
 We also investigate whether investment behaviour of firms changes as the 
state of the economy changes by augmenting the model with a period dummy for 
joining the European Union (EU), firm size, financial development and business 
cycles.   
It is noted that we focus on large firms on the following grounds:  Financial 
markets in transition economies were underdeveloped so that firms were liquidity-
constrained, whilst SBCs were an important component in the formation of capital 
investment.  It is theoretically and economically supported that the investment of 
relatively large firms or state-owned establishments was not liquidity-constrained 
owing to generous financing from state banks, but that the opposite holds for smaller 
firms (Schaffer, 1989).  See also Lizal and Svejnar (2002) for empirical evidence for 
the large enterprises in the Czech Republic5.  Large firms are, therefore, suitable for 
the investigation of SBCs potentially generating more consistent empirical 
performance, and satisfying the purpose of this paper. 
                                                 
4 It is recently reported that emerging Europe is the only region in the emerging markets sector where 
banks have net debt, which stands at more than $400 billion and is growing fast (Times, 1st June, 
2008). 
5 Lízal and Svejnar ( 2002)  find smaller sized firms were rationed in their access to credit, but large 
firms were not, providing strong evidence that many large firms have been operating with SBCs.  They 
also argue that larger firms in the Czech Republic had virtually unlimited access to capital.     
 
 
 
7 
 
 The key estimation results are as follows.  There is an indication of SBCs in 
determining investment for the Czech Republic and Poland, whereas for Hungary and 
the Baltic countries, the operation of SBCs seems to be weak.  A disciplinary policy 
to curtail the practice of SBCs in the Czech Republic and Poland is advisable.  It is 
also found that entry to the EU, financial development and business cycles mitigate 
the practice of SBCs, and that the current on-going integration with EU financial 
markets and the promotion of financial development would enhance and improve the 
efficient allocation of resources.  
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents the structural 
investment model based on a dynamic optimization problem, and derives the 
empirical model for estimation.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 provides the 
empirical results.  Section 5 examines the effect of entry to the EU, firm size, 
financial development and business cycles on SBCs.  Section 6 concludes.   
 
 
2.  Investment Model 
We derive the Q and Euler models from the profit maximization problem.  Following 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), Love (2003) and Koo and Maeng (2005), we 
assume that firms maximise the present value of the firm: 
max),( =ttt AKV  ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡+ ∑∞
=
+−+
1
1
s
ststtt DED β       (1) 
Subject to: tttttt IKICAKD −−Π= ),(),(  
where tK  = the beginning of the period capital stock ( ttt IKK +−=+ )1(1 δ ), tA  = a 
productivity shock, tD  = dividend, β  = discount factor, δ = depreciation rate, tI  = 
investment, Π= profit and C = adjustment cost of investment.   
1) The Q model 
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We define marginal Q as the ratio of the increase in a firm’s value to one additional 
unit of capital, then the first-order condition for investment is given by (Koo and 
Maeng 2005): 
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For the adjustment cost function, linear homogeneity in capital and investment is 
assumed, and it is given by: 
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The lagged investment to capital implies that it may be easier for the firm to continue 
investment at some fraction γ of the previous period ratio, since, for example, 
alternative arrangements would be costly.   
 We assume the expected returns at the beginning of period t by the actual 
returns realized over the period plus an expectation error.  Then, substituting (3) into 
(2) generates the form of: 
itit
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Following Hsiao (1996), we specify the disturbance terms  , equal to  
where  capture a firm-specific fixed effect and   is white noise. 
 The base model implies that Q is the sole determinant of investment.  
Following the investment literature, we specify the cash flow (CF) variable, which 
captures firms’ internal financial positions, often providing the impact of financial 
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constraints on investment6.  Specific to transition economies, credit flows (Credit), i.e. 
bank loans are also specified to capture the impact of SBCs: 
 it
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The positive coefficient on cf/k is usually interpreted as an indication that the firms 
are credit constrained.  It is based on the assumption that if external finance is costly 
due to the underdeveloped capital markets of developing countries, firms use internal 
finance for investment.  A test for the existence of financing constraints amounts to 
that for the statistical significance of cf/k.  Lízal and Svejnar (2002) and Konings et al. 
(2003) argue that a zero coefficient on cf/k signals that firms have easy access to bank 
credit suggesting the presence of SBCs (see also Mueller and Peev 2007).  This 
interpretation seems to be simplistic and misleading..  For example as financial 
markets develop with an increase in alternative external finance, the coefficient on 
cf/k may become insignificant regardless of the presence of SBCs.  In order directly to 
capture the impact of SBCs on investment, Credit/k is specified as an additional 
variable.   
 Likewise the limitation of cash flow, the sensitivity to Credit/k may not 
necessarily arise as the consequence of the SBCs.  The plausible balanced 
interpretation is that if both cash and credit flows are statistically significant, then 
firms are more likely to suffer from financial constraints: the inadequate amount of 
credit released under SBCs may force firms to rely on internal funds.  It could be the 
result of a pecking order in place, but again it indicates the weak operation of SBCs.  
On the other hand, the high sensitivity of firms’ investment decisions to the supply of 
                                                 
6 Love (2003) specified the stock of liquid assets scaled by total assets as a measure of the internal 
funds.  In the presence of financing constraints, firms would accumulate cash stock to use up when the 
opportunities arise.   
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bank funds without resorting to cash flow may signal the dominance of SBCs in 
corporate finance.   
 The interpretation of Credit is different from that of Bhaduri (2005), who 
applies the investment function of the sales accelerator type, with the sales, cash flow 
and long-term debt as regressors, to panel data for Indian firms.  Bhaduri argues that 
highly leveraged firms may adversely affect the availability of external finance, since 
an increase in leverage pushes up the cost of borrowing and reduces investment.  The 
coefficients on credit are found to be mostly negative in Bhaduri’s study7, clearly 
demonstrating the adverse effect of credit for Indian firms.  By contrast, in this study, 
the coefficients on Credit/k turn out to be all positive, as shown in Section 4.  The 
message is that the same interpretation can not be applied to economies with different 
economic structures.  Günçavdi et al. (1998) point out that if the credit constraint is 
binding for firms, investment will be (positively) sensitive to the flow of credit, and 
firms’ investments will be less than predicted in the unconstrained model8.  The role 
of credit in our model is conceptually similar to that of Günçavdi et al. (1998) apart 
from the fact that credit is interpreted as a corollary of SBCs. 
    
2) The Euler equation model 
From the profit maximization model (1), we introduce financial frictions via 0≥tD , 
i.e. nonnegativity constraint on dividends.  The multiplier ( tλ ) on the non-negativity 
constraint on dividends equals to the extra cost being associated with raising new 
equity (Love 2003).  This implies that external financing incurs the extra cost.   The 
equation (2) is modified as given by 
                                                 
7 See Table 1,  p.9 (Bhaduri 2005). 
8Günçavdi et al. (1998) examined investment decisions for Turkey based on the neo-classical model 
with the user cost of capital.  The data used are aggregated data.  
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The Euler equation is derived by combining the equations (6) and (7): 
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where 
I
C
∂
∂  = the marginal adjustment cost of investment and 
K∂
Π∂ = MPK= the 
marginal product of capital.  Following Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999), we assume 
that a production function has a Cobb-Douglas form, then   
where S represents sales.  Also we assume that the firm makes the period t investment 
decision at the end of the period t-1, thus the timing for the sales to capital ratio is the 
end of period t.  The relative shadow cost of external finance in periods t and t+1 is 
expressed as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+=Θ +
t
t
t λ
λ
1
1 1   referred to as a factor of financial constraint.  If the 
shadow cost of external funds is higher in period t than in period t+1, then 1<Θt . 
This may be a factor which induces the firm to postpone or reduce its investment, 
where the firm is said to be ‘financially constrained’ (Love 2003),  tΘ  is the measure 
of financing constraints.  tλ  is assumed to be associated with time-varying observable 
firm characteristics, and the cash flow is commonly used as the variable.9  However, 
specifically for the former socialist countries, with the presence of SBCs, the firm 
may expect to be more constrained at t+1 than it is today, and at time t  its investment 
                                                 
9 In perfect capital markets, λ is zeo. 
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will be less constrained.  In this case the firm is more likely to invest at time t.  This is 
equivalent to firms being financially unconstrained.  So 1≤Θ t  or  1≥Θ t  depending 
on the extent of SBCs in place, and    tΘ  is expressed as a function of cash and credit 
flows as ttt K
Credit
K
CF )()( 210 ϕϕϕ ++=Θ
.  
The Euler equation (8) states that the 
marginal cost of investing today (adjustment cost and the price of investment goods, 
normalized to one) is equal to the sum of the foregone marginal benefit of an extra 
unit in capital and the discounted marginal cost of investing tomorrow.   
 The stochastic discount factor tΘ  in a multiplicative form is specified as 
additively.  Using a first-order Taylor approximation around the means to linearize 
the term, we have 
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This is the Euler model and used for estimation. 
 
3.  Data 
The firm data are for 6 new EU countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from 1995 to 2006.  The study of relatively 
advanced countries among the new EU countries and the Baltic countries may provide 
a useful comparative study.      
 The firm data are collected from the Reuters databases, which contain data of 
large listed firms with a longer sample period.  To supplement the data from this 
source, firms’ data are also collected from the OSIRIS database, which also contains 
major firms.  Banks and other financial institutions are excluded.  Firms are chosen 
where data are available at the latest for the year of 2005 in order to see the effect of 
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entry to the EU, which took place in May 2004, and also where there are a minimum 
of 7 consecutive years.  The turnover for the firms chosen is greater than US$15 
million at 2006.  The aggregate data are collected from the World Development 
Indicators.    
   The detail of the variables, means and the standard deviations of the key 
variables and a number of firms and observations are found in Table 1.  The Czech 
Republic has a relatively high standard deviation for the investment-to-capital ratio 
amongst other countries.  In general, the variable of Q has a lower standard deviation 
relative to the mean being less noisy as compared with the rest of the variables, except 
for Latvia.  There are  relatively limited data available for the Baltic countries, and 
this caveat needs to be taken into consideration in the empirical result, at the same 
time this may be one of the reasons why there is no empirical work on firms in these 
countries.  As to the variable of credit, we consider the Current Liability (bank loans) 
rather than long-term loans.  Long-term debt is, normally, obtained through the capital 
market, and this would increase in line with financial market development.  It is 
unlikely to reflect the extent of the SBCs10.   
[Table 1 around here] 
  
4. Estimation and result 
In equations (5) and (9), the error term may capture shocks derived from changes in 
technology or productivity, and in turn the shocks may affect sales, cash flows or 
profitability.  Hence regressors and error terms are, , potentially correlated, and the 
investment model is likely to suffer from endogeneity problems.  To address this 
                                                 
10 It is known that the current liability is used not only for tangible fixed assets, but also for working 
capital, R & D and market research, yet the latter stimulates the level of fixed assets.    
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issue, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) techniques of Arellano and Bond 
(1991) are applied for estimation.  The methodology requires instrument variables.  
The GMM estimator minimizes some criterion functions.  It does not require 
information on the exact distribution of the disturbances, and parameter estimates are 
chosen in a way that the correlations between the instruments and disturbances are 
almost zero. By choosing an appropriate weighting matrix in the criterion function, 
GMM can be made robust to heteroskedasticity and to serial correlation. 
In the GMM model, over-identification restrictions are used to test for the 
validity of instrument variables, whereas a serial correlation test is used to check the 
presence of individual firm effects.  The presence of unobserved firm effects implies 
that the GMM is modelled by differencing each variable in order to remove the firm-
specific effects11.  Arellano and Bond (1991) demonstrate that, in a first difference 
model, good instruments are the values of the endogenous explanatory variables dated 
t-2 or at earlier dates, as they are unlikely to correlate with the contemporaneous first 
differenced error term.  The instrument variables used in this study are the lagged, 
once and twice dependent variables and regressors in level, since they are orthogonal 
to the disturbances.   
 The regression results based on Q and Euler models are reported in Table 2a-
2b.   
[Table 2 around here] 
The first-and second-order serial correlation test statistics mostly indicate the absence 
of serial correlation at the 5% or at least at the 1% level (though some exhibit serial 
correlation in either the first order or the second order at the 1% level, but not both 
orders together).  This suggests that little unobserved individual effects remain in the 
                                                 
11 The firm-specific features include issues such as ownership and  legal status.   
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GMM estimation results.  Where there is heteroskedasticity detected, White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are applied.  The over-identification tests 
indicate that the null is not rejected in all cases at the the conventional significance 
level, suggesting that the one- and two-lagged levels of variables as instruments are 
valid.  Overall these tests seem to be satisfactory, supporting the model specification.  
In view of the difficulties that are frequently encountered in estimating this type of  
model, our estimates are encouraging. 
 The data are increasingly supportive of the Euler rather than the Q model, 
when one notices that more coefficients on s/k are statistically significant with the 
correct positive sign than those on Q12.  It is often argued that the main limitation with 
implementing the Q-theory is to find a proxy for the unobservable marginal q.  The 
market value of assets relative to their book value is commonly used as a proxy.  
However, due to market imperfections, the market’s valuation tends to be 
considerably divergent, leading to measurement error (see e.g. Kaplan and Zingales 
1997 and Gomes 2001).  We have proxied the q as the ratio of equity and debt to total 
assets, which might raise a measurement error and this may in part explain some of 
the poor performance of the Q- model.  Nevertheless, we present the Q-model 
estimates, as they serve to provide the robustness check for the results of the Euler 
model.          
 Start with Table 2a, which shows the model without Credit/k.  The coefficients 
on the cash flow take different values for the different countries in the model.  As to 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the coefficients are either insignificant or 
                                                 
12 The coefficients on the Q and s/k are not always significant for these economies, and such results 
are not unusual in the investment analysis for emerging markets (see e.g. Lízal and Svejnar, 2002 and 
Bhaduri 2005).  In  underdeveloped financial markets, the imperfection in the capital market is severe, 
hence the variables of Tobin’s Q or marginal productivity of capital are not likely to exert a strong 
influence.      
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the wrong sign of negative.  This seems to imply less financial constraints in these 
countries.  On the other hand, the coefficients are highly significant being positive for 
Estonia and Lithuania (also Latvia, albeit not in the Euler model).  For Lithuanian 
firms we find a high coefficient of 7.7 and 4.4 in the Q and Euler models respectively, 
suggesting the strong cash sensitivity of investment.  There may be a small degree of 
operation of SBCs in the Baltic countries, which do not have easy access to bank 
loans and so the financial constraints may force the Baltic countries to rely on internal 
finance.   
 Table 3b, where the model is augmented with the variable of credit flow, is 
more informative.   In all cases, the coefficient on the Credit/k is positive and highly 
significant at the 1%  level.    
   Given the insignificant or negative coefficients on cf/k for the Czech Republic 
and Poland, the results confirm that SBCs prevail and firms may not be operating 
under liquidity constraints.   When access to credit is facilitated through preferential 
lending, there is less need of internal finance.  As to Poland the coefficients on cf/k are 
negative in both Table 2a and 2b.  The result seems to reflect the case (recall a 
component of cash flow is net profit),  where the loss-making firms had access to 
capital under SBCs, and on average were able to maintain investment rates that were 
comparable to those of profitable firms (Schaeffer 1998 and Lízal and Svejnar, 2002).   
 Our result is consistent with the study of Lizal and Svejnar (2002) for large 
firms in the Czech Republic, who find an insignificant coefficient on cf/k during 
1992-1998.  However, it is different from that of Konings et al (2003) for the Czech 
Republic and Poland, who found statistically significant cash flows and suggested that 
the results were due to a lesser operation of SBCs.  The different sizes of firms and 
also different sample periods used in their study may have resulted in conflicting 
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results.  It is, however, noted that the available data indicate that, during their sample 
period of 1994-1999, domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP) for the Czech 
Republic amounted to a relatively high 67.9% (World Development Indicator)13.  
Also, having gone through an unexpected recession during 1996-1999, the banks in 
the Czech Republic relaxed budget constraints for state-owned firms, partly due to 
political pressure.  The Czech banks accumulated a large portfolio of nonperforming 
loans, and by the mid-to-late 1990s many of them had reached the edge of 
bankruptcy.   On the other hand, the large scale of corporate bankruptcies was avoided 
in the 1990s.  It is, therefore, hard to imagine that firms in the Czech Republic face 
credit constraints, as Koning et al (2003) claim.   As to Hungary and the Baltic 
countries, both coefficients on cf/k and Credit/k are positive significant (though for 
Lithuania, cf/k is insignificant in the Q-model).  Investment increases in line with the 
available cash and credit flows.    The implication is that firms are financially 
constrained, indicating the weak operation of SBCs.       
 It is argued that for Hungarian firms hard budget constraints (HBC) were in 
place.  Bonin and Schaffer (1995) and Shaffer (1998) demonstrated that Hungarian 
banks were not providing net financing to firms that were unprofitable in 1991 and 
1992, and as a consequence large numbers of bankruptcies were observed.  Banks 
were apparently imposing hard budget constraints on firms in the early period of 
transition.   
   The overall result indicates that the operation of SBCs seems to be weak in 
Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whereas it is strong in the Czech Republic 
and Poland.  There is supporting evidence by looking at the banks’ nonperforming 
loans.  See Table 3, where the proportion of banks’ nonperforming loans to total loans 
                                                 
13 For other countries, the domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) is 24.3% in Hungary, 20.6% in 
Poland, 19.7% in Estonia, 11.3% in Latvia and 12.9% in Lithuania (World Development Indicator). 
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(%) for these transition economies is presented for the period 2000 to 2004.  The 
Czech Republic and Poland exhibit a relatively high level of an average of 12.5% and 
18.8% respectively, whilst Hungary and the Baltic countries indicate less than 7%.  If 
the non-performing assets in the banking sector are closely associated with SBCs, this 
confirms our results.     
[Table 3 around here] 
 Moreover, although the transition economies have gone through a similar 
phase of structural change, the privatization process, regulations and institutional 
arrangements differ amongst them, and they may have given rise to the fact that some 
transition economies were prone to the persistent presence of  SBCs.      
In the privatization process of the Czech Republic, each bank set up 
investment funds, which collected the vouchers held by citizens into a mutual fund.  
These vouchers were used to bid for shares of companies.  Since more than 60% of 
such vouchers went to such investment funds, banks became major owners of the 
large enterprises in the Czech Republic.  Hence, banks were willing to make loans 
even to unprofitable firms in which their investment funds hold large stakes.  The 
profitability of commercial banks has not improved as expected due to their continued 
lending to insolvent enterprises (Kutan and Brada, 2000).  The role of financial 
intermediaries was also strong for Poland, where 15 National investment funds (NIF) 
were created to own majority of state owned enterprises (SOE).  Hungary had a 
different stance, since some form of privatization was sought as early as 1968, well 
before the political changes under the New Economic Mechanism (NEM).  First, 
enterprises were separated from direct state control by the introduction of 
intermediary structures, e.g. pension funds, municipalities.  In order to ‘corporatize’ 
enterprises,  joint stock companies were established, where not only banks, pension 
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funds and other SOEs could hold stock, so that stake holders were relatively split 
among these institutions.  Individual entrepreneurship was allowed through the 
leasing of state assets to individuals.  Greater autonomy for SOE was granted to 
management and that decision making was decentralized, therefore the profit 
maximising incentive was relatively strong, and this distinguishes Hungarian firms 
from those in the Czech Republic and Poland.   
 In terms of external funds availability, the rights of foreign shareholders under 
Hungarian law in Hungarian firms created  a strong connection between privatization 
and FDI, thus there obtaining external funds from abroad became easier.  The reliance 
on the SBCs could be, as empirically evidenced,  minimal.  On the other hand, the 
Czech government was unwilling to allow foreign banks to enter the market, which 
has worsened the lack of competition by the banks’ ownership of enterprises and by 
the domination of the market by a few large banks.  
 The enforcement of bankruptcy law may also provide a useful insight into our 
results.  In Hungary, a bankruptcy law was established in 1991.  It was deemed as an 
essential component of economic reform, hence the provision of the Bankruptcy Act 
was extremely strict.  It  forced the management of firms to initiate bankruptcy 
proceedings, once they held overdue debts.  The automatic forced bankruptcy 
improved the disciplinary stance amongst managements in firms and hardened the 
budget constraint of Hungarian firms.  In the Czech Republic, the bankruptcy 
regulation was also enacted in 1991, yet a large number of bankruptcies was avoided, 
as mentioned above, due to the number of restrictions under the law.  There was also a 
lack of accountability amongst managers of firms, as there was no specified criminal 
liability for failing to comply with the law until 2000 (see Janda, 2008 for more 
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detail).  It appears that such a loose bankruptcy law played a role as a prerequisite for 
easing the practice of the SBCs in the Czech Republic14.         
 
5. EU entry, firm size, financial development and business cycle 
In this section, potential factors which may cause a shift in parameters are 
investigated by augmenting the investment model with proxy variables.  It is noted 
that these factors may serve as conditional variables.   
1) Augmented models 
EU entry 
In May 2004, 10 Central Eastern European countries joined the EU.  The new 
member states were conditioned to a series of new institutional arrangements based on 
the Copenhagen Criteria, including a constraint on state transfers to firms, restriction 
of the payment of subsidies to loss-making enterprises, decentralization of credit 
allocation, and privatization of state banks (Brücker et al.  2005).  Although the extent 
of the enforcement of these conditions is not certain, during the phase of EU 
integration a decline in the SBCs is envisaged.  Also, scope for the acquisition of 
external finance becomes wider, reducing the role of cash flow in investment 
decisions.  Hence, entry to the EU is expected to mitigate financial constraints and 
SBCs, promoting more market-determined investment decisions.  It is, therefore, 
hypothesised that the sensitivity to both cash and credit flows weakens in the post 
entry period.   
                                                 
14 Maskin and Xu (2001) treats the SBCs as a financial commitment problem of not imposing 
bankruptcy on the defaulting entrepreneur. 
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 To test whether joining the EU has affected determinants of investment, we 
specify slope dummy variables of EU for cf/k and Credit/k, 1 for 2004-2006 and 0 
otherwise as given by. 
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where d = EU.  The re-specified Q and Euler equations (10) and (11) respectively 
apply to other factors of Financial development (FD), Size and Business cycles, and 
that d = FD, Size and Business cycle (see below).  
 
Financial development (FD) 
Investment behaviour is likely to have undergone changes as the firms proceeded 
through the transition process, and so we estimate both models by augmenting them 
with the variable of financial development (FD).  We consider the stock market 
development and financial intermediaries’ development as a proxy to FD.  Stock 
market development is the sum of the ratio of market capitalization to GDP (i.e. the 
size of stock market) and total value traded to GDP.  Financial intermediaries’ 
development is the sum of the ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP and the credit for 
the private sector to GDP.  Note that the Central Eastern European countries have 
gone through different phases of exchange-rate regime arrangements over the sample 
period.  The fixed regime was an initial step in an anti-inflation strategy.  Hungary 
and Poland moved from a fixed exchange rate regime with varying bands to a  
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managed and full floating rate system in 2001 and 2000 respectively.  The currency 
crises forced the Czech Republic to introduce managed floating exchange rates in 
1997.  The Baltic countries have maintained fixed exchange rates over the sample 
period, and Estonia and Lithuania joined the ERM II in 200415.  Since the capital 
market is affected by the exchange rate system, the variable of FD is a way of 
capturing such changes in financial regimes.  The main hypothesis is, similar to the 
case for EU entry, that financing constraints and SBCs should decrease with financial 
development, i.e. the interaction of FD with cash and credit flows is expected to be 
negative.  
 
Size effect 
Firm size has been commonly used to identify firms that are likely to be financially 
constrained.  Although we have focused on large firms, there is a considerable 
difference in the scale of operation across large firms, making it meaningful to 
investigate the size effect amongst large firms.  Smaller firms are more likely to suffer 
from financing constraints due to a larger information asymmetry and also due to a 
lesser degree of SBCs as compared with larger firms.  In order to examine the 
contention, the interaction of size (measured by the log of total assets) with cf/k and 
Credit/k is specified in both models.  See equation (10) and (11) above.  It is 
hypothesized that 05 <β , i.e. financial constraints are smaller for larger firms and 6β  
> 0, SBCs is larger for larger firms. 
 
Business Cycles 
                                                 
15 The Maastricht exchange rate criterion implies a participation in the ERM II for new EU countries as 
a prerequisite for joining the single currency.   
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The financing constraints theory states that the information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders creates agency costs, which manifest themselves in the wedge 
between internal and external financing costs.  These costs may decrease with an 
increase in the borrower’s net worth.  Since the net worth is likely to be procyclical, 
the agency costs may decline in a boom and rise in a recession.  The interaction of the 
real GDP growth rate as economic conditions is, therefore, specified.  Economic 
boom periods are associated with the lower level of financing constraints, i.e. the 
negative coefficient on the interaction of cf/k*d in equation (10) and (11) is predicted.  
Whether SBCs contract or expand is difficult to predict.  When an economy booms, 
banks may be willing to release credit under SBCs with a lower risk of default, on the 
other hand, it is also true that it makes it easy for firms to obtain funds from the 
capital market, reducing borrowing from banks.  
 
2) Results 
The empirical results are found in Table 4.  In terms of diagnostics, refer to Section 3, 
since, more or less, comments similar to those for Table 2a and 2b apply.  The 
robustness of the results may be found in that the earlier findings of the stronger role 
of SBCs in investments in the Czech Republic and Poland, and the weaker operation 
of SBCs in Hungary and the Baltic countries, remain to be the same in the augmented 
models, when one notices the sign and significance of the coefficients on cf/k and 
Credit/k16.      
[Table 4 around here] 
 
                                                 
16 Recall that the coefficients on both cf/k and Credit/k tend to be positive and significant for Hungary 
and the Baltic countries as an indication of weak SBCs, whereas the coefficient on cf/k is insignificant 
or negative and that on Credit/k is significant suggesting a strong role for SBCs for the Czech Republic 
and Poland.  
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EU dummies (Table 4a) 
As to the effect of entry to the EU, since the sign on the coefficient on Credit/k*EU is 
negative, the operation of SBCs has weakened for all cases as predicted (except for 
Estonia in the Euler model.)  Our results are consistent with those of Brücker et al 
(2005), who examined the SBCs with the variables of labour productivity, using 
pooled aggregate data for  twenty-six transition countries during 1989-2002.   Brücker 
et al. found that EU candidate countries had a lower labour-to-output ratio in the long 
run, and a high speed of adjustment of labour productivity to its long-run, which were 
taken as indicators of the softness of budget constraints, suggesting that EU entry 
condition has decreased the practice of SBCs for the candidate countries.  Note, 
however, that for Poland and Latvia, cf/k*EU  is positively significant.  Firms in these 
countries may face financial constraints, as a result of reduced SBCs in the post-entry 
period.   
 
FD (Table 4b) 
A negative coefficient on credit/k*FD for the Czech Republic and Poland provides 
evidence that an improvement in the functioning of financial markets appears to allow 
firms for easier access to external funds, thus reducing their reliance on the SBCs.  
Also, banks may be attracted to more profitable financial innovations, and the sources 
of funds under SBCs may be curtailed.  In the case of Hungary, investment decisions 
became sensitive to the availability of loans as shown with the positive coefficient on 
Credit*FD, whilst financial constraints are reduced as given by the negative 
coefficient on cf/k*FD.  The results for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
highlight the weakening of financial constraints, being consistent with the existing 
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literature17.  As to the Baltic countries, the positive sign on cf/k*FD and negative sign 
on Credit/k*FD seems to imply that FD contributes to the reduction of SBCs, though 
with a persistent financial constraint.     
 
Firm Size (Table 4c) 
The observation of the positive coefficient on Credit/k*size indicates that the larger 
the firm is, the more SBCs are prevalent in all cases.  A negative sign on the 
coefficient of cf/k*size for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Lithuania 
appears to suggest that smaller firms tend to suffer from credit crunches18.  Overall 
results support the prediction that larger firms benefit from SBCs and smaller firms 
are disadvantaged in obtaining funds.    
 
Business cycle (Table 4d) 
A sign on the interaction of cash and credit flows and business cycles (GDP) is mostly 
negative.  Financial constraints are softened with growth in the economy, and a 
booming economy appears to reduce the need for rescue funds for the survival of  
firms, as their profitability increases.  As for Hungary, with the positive sign on 
Credit/k*BUSI, banks who are shy about SBCs as discussed above, may release more 
loans as the economy improves with a consequential lower default risk.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Restructuring of firms in terms of their financing is viewed as one of the key factors 
to a successful transition from a planned to a market economy.  We have used 
                                                 
17 For example, using the Euler equation methodology, Laeven (2003) finds that progress in financial 
liberalization reduces firms’ financing constraints.  Galindo et al. (2001) find that financial reform has 
led to an increase in the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. 
18 As for Estonia and Latvia, the coefficients are mostly insignificant.  This may be due to the limited 
number of firms used in estimation. 
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comparable large firm-level data for transition economies in order to analyze the 
impact of soft budget constraints on firms’ investment behaviour for the new EU 
member states.   
 It is found that the extent of SBCs differs across Central Eastern European 
countries.  The Czech Republic and  Poland show some signs of persistent operation 
of SBCs with less credit constraints, suggesting that SBCs are an important 
determinant of investment.  The lower credit constraints point to a lower external 
finance premium.  However, in an environment where SBCs are prevalent, this may 
well imply an inefficient financial sector and  severe asymmetric information arising 
from the SBCs (Budina et al 2000).  On the other hand,  there is a weak indication of 
SBCs for  the Baltic countries and Hungary, and these countries encounter financing 
constraints, facing a higher external finance premium. 
 In terms of policy implications, our results indicate that a disciplinary policy 
to further curtail the practice of SBCs in the Czech Republic and Poland is advisable 
in order to avoid a credit squeeze on small firms, whilst it should be noted that 
Hungary and the Baltic countries may be vulnerable to credit constraints.  Given the 
fact that such factors as joining the EU, financial development and business cycles are 
more likely to mitigate the practice of SBCs and financial constraints, the currently 
on-going policy of integration with EU financial markets and the promotion of 
financial development would enhance the efficient allocation of resources.    
 The study sheds light on an appropriate plausible investment model for 
transition economies and raises a question on the application of conventional 
investment models to these economies.  An investment model with the specification 
of implied bank loans seems to better approximate the complexity of corporate 
finance for these transition economies.  Measuring the extent of the bearing on the 
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economy by the SBCs is, as yet, empirically incomplete, since there are variations in 
the form of SBCs.  A further development of an empirical framework for SBCs would 
be useful.   
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Table 1 
 
Variable definitions 
Notation 
 
Description 
ti Investment: )( 1 ttt KDEPK −+= +  
K t  Capital at the beginning of period t (= tangible fixed assets at the end of the 
period  t-1) 
DEP t  Deprecation during period t 
Qt
 Average Q at the beginning of period t (=(book value of long term debtt-1 + 
equityt-1)/Total asset t-1) 
CF t  Cash flow during the period t (= net profit after tax + depreciationt-1) 
Creditt Credit flow = Current liability t – Current liability t-1 
 Sales during period t 
Eu dummy 1 for 2004 -2006 and 0 otherwise 
FD = market capitalisation to GDP + total value traded to GDP + ratio of M3 to 
GDP +  ratio of the credit for the private sector to GDP. 
Size Log of total assets 
Business 
cycles 
Annual real growth rate of GDP 
Data for the equity is retrieved from Shareholders Equity in a company’s balance 
sheet.       
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
    i/k Q s/k cf/k Credit/k Firms Obs. 
Czech  Mean 0.038 0.652 1.468 0.165 -0.004     
   Std. Dev. 0.219 0.177 0.981 0.238 0.207 278 2245 
Hungary  Mean 1.111 0.689 8.184 0.221 0.068    
  Std. Dev. 1.607 0.175 11.128 0.433 1.557 122 
  
1037 
Poland  Mean 0.573 0.522 11.132 1.053 0.802    
   Std. Dev. 0.576 0.322 11.397 1.766 11.485 368 3123 
Estonia  Mean 0.187 0.694 3.708 0.486 0.303    
   Std. Dev. 0.395 0.183 4.86 0.584 1.001 42 378 
Latvia  Mean 0.148 0.75 2.712 0.318 0.141    
   Std. Dev. 0.403 0.171 2.943 0.663 0.626 78 678 
Lithuania  Mean 0.301 0.717 4.885 0.21 1.35    
   Std. Dev. 1.475 0.168 24.651 0.267 10.725 43 386 
Sample period: 1995-2006 
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Table 2a  Dependent variable i/k (without credit)  
 Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Q model Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.156* (-1.721) -0.003 (-0.649) -0.243*** (-8.534) -0.190* (-1.771) -0.505*** (-3.492) -0.287 (-0.942) 
Q 0.119 (0.541) 1.358 (1.451) 13.024*** (6.882) 1.115** (2.228) -1.121 (-1.532) 0.569 (0.245) 
(cf/k)t-1 0.061 (0.705) 0.047 (0.379) -7.383*** (-22.258) 0.466*** (2.771) 0.338*** (3.735) 7.705*** (5.339) 
             
LM auto [1]  2.624  5.881  5.030  0.139  0.886  0.039 
LM auto [2]  3.335  0.223  3.957  0.031  0.467  0.576 
LM Hetero [3]   7.257  0.933  3.793  1.774  0.172  3.127 
Over ident [3].  9.148  9.460  8.028  2.083  3.859  1.815 
             
Euler model Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.153* (-1.794) -0.003 (-0.523) -0.007 (-1.524) -0.174 (-1.441) -0.437*** (-2.864) -0.410 (-1.244) 
(s/k)t 0.086* (1.873) 0.138*** (192.016) 0.230*** (160.034) 0.009 (0.207) 0.089* (1.806) 0.024*** (3.061) 
(cf/k)t 0.127 (1.368) 0.215 (1.485) -0.133** (-2.058) 0.589*** (3.547) 0.137 (0.922) 4.498** (2.121) 
             
LM auto [1]  3.216  4.758  4.888  0.140  0.860  0.024 
LM auto [2]  3.347  10.105  5.681  0.044  0.563  0.316 
LM Hetero [3]   2.415  0.121  4.930  0.976  0.191  2.506 
Over ident [3].  6.968  11.217  5.667  0.175  3.599  1.477 
t-ratio *,** and *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%. 
[ . ] degree of freedom.  Critical value at the 5%  df =1  3.84, df=2  5.99, df=3  7.82, at the 1% df=1  6.64, df=2  9.21, df=3  11.34.   
Based on GMM.  The instrument variables used are (i/k)t-1, (i/k)t-2, (cf/k)t-1 and (cf/k)t-2, and  Qt-1, Qt-2 and (s/k)t-1, (s/k)t-2 are used for the Q and Euler models respectively. 
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Table 2b  Dependent variable i/k (with credit, base model)  
 Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Q model Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio  Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.161* -1.860 0.001 0.332 -0.007 -1.430 -0.065 -0.736 -0.427*** -3.182 -0.529*** -4.296 
Q -0.158 -0.697 0.428 0.633 0.614* 1.818 0.132 0.305 -0.698 -1.032 0.138 0.149 
(cf/k)t 0.040 0.477 0.824*** 7.535 -0.126* -1.637 0.362*** 2.704 0.356*** 4.302 1.187 1.444 
(Credit/k)t 0.233*** 3.084 0.919*** 12.967 0.868*** 142.512 0.857*** 5.527 1.196*** 3.262 2.384*** 15.250 
             
LM auto [1]  2.188  5.308  9.419  0.212  0.904  0.002 
LM auto [2]  3.116  0.004  7.522  0.193  0.687  0.115 
LM Hetero [4]  6.515  9.460  10.406  1.069  0.588  1.420 
Over ident. [4]  8.993  6.999  8.567  2.721  4.206  4.386 
       
Euler model Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio  Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.122 -1.439 0.002 0.601 -0.008* -1.719 -0.012 -0.130 -0.439*** -3.074 -0.388 -1.262 
(s/k)t 0.061 1.214 0.105*** 6.028 0.134*** 13.002 0.045 1.324 0.014 0.261 0.087** 2.108 
(cf/k)t 0.039 0.479 0.938*** 8.567 -0.088 -1.404 0.325*** 2.449 0.331** 2.148 4.841** 2.442 
(Credit/k)t 0.202*** 2.931 1.126*** 13.982 0.363*** 9.321 0.903*** 6.267 1.208*** 2.888 0.167*** 2.743 
             
LM auto [1]  2.695  8.524  6.321  0.212  0.904  0.495 
LM auto [2]  3.462  0.000  5.691  0.193  0.687  0.007 
LM Hetero [4]  3.859  12.794  4.134  0.872  0.458  3.456 
Over ident. [4]  7.046  11.900  7.872  -0.688  3.553  5.414 
t-ratio *,** and *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%. 
[ . ] degree of freedom.  Critical value at the 5%  df =1  3.84, df=2  5.99, df=4  9.49, at the 1% df=1  6.64, df=2  9.21, df=4  13.28.   
Based on GMM.  The instrument variables used are (i/k)t-1, (i/k)t-2, (cf/k)t-1, (cf/k)t-2, (credit/k)t-1  and (credit/k)t-2 , and  Qt-1, Qt-2 and (s/k)t-1, (s/k)t-2 are used for the Q and Euler 
models respectively. 
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Table 3  Bank non-performing loans to total (%)  
       
 Czech Rep Hungary Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
2000 29.3 3 15.5 1 4.6 11.3 
2001 13.7 2.7 18.6 1.3 2.8 8.3 
2002 10.6 2.9 22 0.8 2 6.5 
2003 4.9 2.6 22.2 0.4 1.4 3 
2004 4.1 2.7 15.5 0.3 1.1 2.3 
Mean 12.52 2.78 18.76 0.76 2.38 6.28 
(Source: World Development Indicators) 
The data prior to 2000 are not available. 
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Table 4a  Dependent variable i/k (with EU dummy)  
 Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Q model Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio  Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.155** -1.918 0.003 1.268 -0.012** -2.256 -0.061 -0.671 -0.519*** -3.378 -0.409*** -2.830 
Q -0.590 -1.509 -0.554 -0.932 -0.310 -1.387 0.191 0.428 -0.308 -0.315 -0.868 -1.023 
(cf/k)t 0.150 0.660 0.064 0.333 -0.615*** -4.388 0.431*** 2.805 0.752 1.476 0.277 0.218 
(Credit/k)t 0.768*** 2.590 1.291*** 17.308 0.802*** 5.207 0.863*** 5.143 0.610*** 2.446 2.707*** 2.850 
(cf/k)t*EU -0.040 -0.181 0.458* 1.963 2.052*** 14.116 -0.137 -1.222 0.932** 2.042 1.283 1.021 
(Credit/k)t*EU -0.263 -0.518 -0.860*** -7.641 -0.456*** -2.841 -0.004 -0.020 -0.192 -0.884 -0.379 -0.367 
             
LM auto [1]  2.072  7.087  8.238  0.384  0.798  0.000 
LM auto [2]  2.893  6.119  5.043  0.218  0.618  0.548 
LM Hetero[6]   6.461  15.974  9.832  1.536  0.544  1.608 
Over ident.[6]  2.543  8.641  7.954  3.261  5.126  4.520 
       
Euler model Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio  Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.115 -1.362 0.004 1.136 -0.003 -0.852 -0.018 -0.187 -0.454*** -3.070 -0.359*** -2.544 
s/k 0.121** 2.332 0.159*** 8.866 0.147*** 5.358 0.038 0.968 0.157* 1.705 0.049*** 8.954 
(cf/k)t -0.036 -0.156 0.334* 1.820 -0.775*** -8.111 0.380** 2.324 1.141** 2.172 4.428*** 4.626 
(Credit/k)t 0.541* 1.892 1.376*** 16.584 0.683*** 7.142 0.894*** 5.836 0.456* 1.811 2.772*** 3.126 
(cf/k)t*EU 0.145 0.648 0.211 0.907 1.584*** 17.316 -0.096 -0.816 1.014** 2.367 -3.167*** -2.944 
(Credit/k)t*EU -0.730 -1.400 -0.691*** -5.807 -0.324*** -3.249 0.042 0.209 -0.228 -1.082 -0.157 -0.174 
             
LM auto [1]  2.453  7.811  4.536  0.384  0.798  0.073 
LM auto [2]  3.462  7.321  8.101  0.218  0.618  0.056 
LM Hetero[6]   4.007  2.337  13.588  2.075  0.502  1.869 
Over ident.[6]  6.691  11.969  10.868  -0.832  3.419  2.618 
t-ratio *,** and *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%. 
[ . ] degree of freedom.  Critical value at the 5%  df =1  3.84, df=2  5.99, df=6  12.59, at the 1% df=1  6.64, df=2  9.21, df=6  16.81.   
Based on GMM.  The instrument variables used are (i/k)t-1, (i/k)t-2, (cf/k)t-1, (cf/k)t-2, (credit/k)t-1, (credit/k)t-2 , (cf/k)t-1*EU,  (Credit/k)t-1*EU, (cf/k)t-2*EU and   (Credit/k)t-
2*EU.   Qt-1, Qt-2 and (s/k)t-1, (s/k)t-2 are used for the Q and Euler models respectively. 
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Table 4b  Dependent variable i/k (with FD)  
 Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.162* -1.877 0.002 0.655 -0.004 -0.865 -0.254** -2.220 -0.547*** -3.734 -0.513*** -4.041 
Q -0.176 -0.776 -0.289 -0.471 -0.304* -1.730 1.266** 2.074 0.163 0.183 0.426 0.418 
(cf/k)t 0.484 0.370 3.681*** 4.115 -1.942 -0.869 0.365 0.515 6.004*** 3.037 1.017 -0.401 
(Credit/k)t 2.127** 1.963 2.148*** 5.332 8.233*** 18.578 0.737* 1.686 1.934** 2.194 3.001** 2.395 
(cf/k)t*FD -0.003 -0.278 -0.035*** -3.540 -0.054*** -7.984 0.013 1.395 0.133*** 3.196 0.001 0.015 
(Credit/k)t*FD -0.019* -1.739 0.031*** 7.753 -0.105*** -17.125 -0.007 -1.348 -0.033* -1.796 -0.009 -0.469 
             
LM auto [1]  2.363  2.639  2.987  0.320  0.696  0.007 
LM auto [2]  3.191  1.038  1.868  0.200  0.537  0.374 
LM Hetero[6]   6.675  19.078  20.342  1.349  0.505  2.077 
Over ident.[6]  9.390  8.935  9.038  3.084  4.679  4.467 
       
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.123 -1.452 0.003 0.947 -0.002 -0.586 -0.165 -1.426 -0.507*** -3.604 -0.667*** -3.199 
s/k 0.059 1.181 0.092*** 5.917 0.109*** 18.301 0.004 0.085 0.135 1.576 1.521*** 8.292 
(cf/k)t 0.279 0.217 4.783*** 6.895 -1.042 -1.389 0.726 1.008 6.452*** 3.353 7.980 -1.570 
(Credit/k)t 2.107* 1.955 1.011*** 3.316 5.549*** 13.927 0.939** 2.108 1.845** 2.166 7.303*** 8.149 
(cf/k)t*FD -0.001 -0.124 -0.044*** -5.765 -0.008 -1.278 0.017* 1.913 0.136*** 3.395 0.332*** 3.713 
(Credit/k)t*FD -0.019* -1.763 0.022*** 7.291 -0.069*** -12.589 -0.009* -1.662 -0.034** -1.964 -0.071*** -8.002 
             
LM auto [1]  3.006  4.890  5.977  0.320  0.696  0.057 
LM auto [2]  3.646  4.243  7.623  0.200  0.537  0.016 
LM Hetero[6]   3.942  8.931  27.485  1.659  0.415  1.629 
Over ident.[6]  7.318  11.778  10.808  -0.759  2.671  3.760 
t-ratio *,** and *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%. 
[ . ] degree of freedom.  Critical value at the 5%  df =1  3.84, df=2  5.99, df=6  12.59, at the 1% df=1  6.64, df=2  9.21, df=6  16.81.   
Based on GMM.  The instrument variables used are (i/k)t-1, (i/k)t-2,  (cf/k)t-1, (cf/k)t-2, (credit/k)t-1, (credit/k)t-2 , (cf/k)t-1*FD,  (Credit/k)t-1*FD, (cf/k)t-2*FD,  (Credit/k)t-2*FD.   
Qt-1, Qt-2 and (s/k)t-1, (s/k)t-2 are used for the Q and Euler models respectively. 
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Table 4c  Dependent variable i/k (with firm size)  
 Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.200*** -2.473 0.011*** 3.743 -0.003 -0.812 -0.233** -1.966 -0.421*** -3.129 -0.468*** -3.765 
Q -0.635*** -2.917 0.687 1.172 -0.232* -1.793 1.156* 1.854 -1.114 -1.394 -0.617 -0.495 
(cf/k)t 1.187 0.702 7.393*** 3.228 -6.390*** -15.880 1.506 0.957 1.239 0.701 1.182 0.151 
(Credit/k)t 3.474** 2.078 4.896*** 8.662 4.325*** 13.157 1.914 1.294 1.240 0.335 5.735*** 3.942 
(cf/k)t*SIZE -0.219*** -2.651 -0.337*** -3.090 -0.406*** -18.315 0.107 1.324 0.100 0.905 -0.030 -0.079 
(Credit/k)t*SIZE 0.188 0.956 0.702*** 9.206 0.282*** 14.362 0.084 1.161 0.000 0.001 1.405*** 4.316 
             
LM auto [1]  2.666  6.604  5.562  0.129  0.781  0.018 
LM auto [2]  3.191  5.987  3.062  0.091  0.641  0.982 
LM Hetero[6]   6.828  9.344  13.890  1.010  0.606  1.044 
Over ident.[6]  6.728  10.187  11.850  0.523  4.999  4.673 
       
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.171** -1.964 0.005 1.398 -0.002 -0.522 -0.143 -1.210 -0.398*** -2.626 -0.466*** -3.427 
s/k 0.094** 1.823 0.145*** 7.190 0.048*** 7.809 0.015 0.312 0.064 0.794 0.039*** 9.767 
(cf/k)t 1.749 1.372 6.802*** 2.904 -4.341*** -9.263 2.290 1.454 1.516 0.623 5.745*** 3.582 
(Credit/k)t 4.058** 2.545 3.630*** 2.861 3.996*** 12.534 1.962 1.220 1.124 0.301 4.927** 2.463 
(cf/k)t*SIZE -0.200** -2.324 -0.284** -2.553 -0.276*** -10.161 0.147* 1.828 0.108 0.758 -0.753*** -3.467 
(Credit/k)t*SIZE 0.202 0.990 0.209*** 3.750 0.264*** 13.873 0.084 1.086 0.001 0.002 0.874*** 2.917 
             
LM auto [1]  3.394  9.650  5.590  0.129  0.781  0.856 
LM auto [2]  3.992  6.494  4.995  0.091  0.641  0.164 
LM Hetero[6]   3.727  13.950  13.600  1.414  0.554  3.608 
Over ident.[6]  6.773  11.263  10.998  -1.307  4.291  3.671 
t-ratio *,** and *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%. 
[ . ] degree of freedom.  Critical value at the 5%  df =1  3.84, df=2  5.99, df=6  12.59, at the 1% df=1  6.64, df=2  9.21, df=6  16.81.   
Based on GMM.  The instrument variables used are (i/k)t-1, (i/k)t-2, (cf/k)t-1, (cf/k)t-2, (credit/k)t-1, (credit/k)t-2 , (cf/k)t-1*SIZE,  (Credit/k)t-1*SIZE, (cf/k)t-2*SIZE,  (Credit/k)t-
2*SIZE.  Qt-1, Qt-2 and (s/k)t-1, (s/k)t-2 are used for the Q and Euler models respectively. 
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Table 4d  Dependent variable i/k (with business cycle)  
 Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.041 -0.497 0.001 0.233 -0.007 -1.372 -0.176 -1.552 -0.513*** -3.432 -0.412*** -2.877 
Q 0.283 1.458 0.293 0.433 -0.263 -1.244 1.262** 2.309 0.714 0.781 -2.723** -2.089 
(cf/k)t -0.179 -1.496 0.538 0.505 -4.284*** -19.828 0.279 1.109 3.298** 2.501 2.080 1.247 
(Credit/k)t 0.420*** 4.974 0.282 0.775 2.253*** 11.335 0.736*** 2.717 1.315** 2.074 2.966*** 4.789 
(cf/k)t*BUSI -0.044 -1.058 -0.067 -0.295 -0.549*** -10.792 -0.050 -1.589 0.515*** 2.763 -0.113 -0.605 
(Credit/k)t*BUSI -0.041** -2.338 0.137* 1.788 -0.342*** -8.564 -0.073** -2.544 -0.146* -1.716 -0.069 -0.902 
             
LM auto [1]  2.877  5.595  3.764  0.284  0.653  0.014 
LM auto [2]  3.788  0.091  3.645  0.128  0.549  0.041 
LM Hetero[6]   6.065  21.980  25.623  1.148  0.461  1.327 
Over ident.[6]  6.842  13.749  5.924  1.078  3.738  2.464 
       
 Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio 
 -0.086 -1.054 0.002 0.590 -0.003 -0.828 -0.083 -0.720 -0.496*** -3.389 -0.402*** -2.596 
s/k 0.076* 1.634 0.107*** 6.381 0.135*** 23.743 0.010 0.241 0.115 1.298 0.035*** 9.384 
(cf/k)t -0.006 -0.043 2.978*** 5.635 -1.283*** -6.197 0.318 1.201 3.324** 2.566 2.954 1.242 
(Credit/k)t 0.368*** 4.137 0.445** 1.972 1.307*** 8.408 0.877*** 3.095 1.059* 1.704 3.179*** 5.390 
(cf/k)t*BUSI -0.002 -0.040 -0.436*** -3.897 -0.158*** -3.772 -0.047 -1.424 0.480** 2.648 -0.203 -0.575 
(Credit/k)t*BUSI -0.031** -2.112 0.151*** 3.276 -0.161*** -5.156 -0.079** -2.624 -0.135* -1.642 -0.078 -1.033 
             
LM auto [1]  3.418  9.072  3.137  0.264  0.653  0.584 
LM auto [2]  4.154  0.370  10.660  0.128  0.549  0.035 
LM Hetero[6]   3.324  28.780  21.477  0.630  0.391  3.595 
Over ident.[6]  6.452  16.501  9.246  -0.867  3.323  5.141 
t-ratio *,** and *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1%. 
[ . ] degree of freedom.  Critical value at the 5%  df =1  3.84, df=2  5.99, df=6  12.59, at the 1% df=1  6.64, df=2  9.21, df=6  16.81.   
Based on GMM.  The instrument variables used are (i/k)t-1, (i/k)t-2, (cf/k)t-1, (cf/k)t-2, (credit/k)t-1, (credit/k)t-2 , (cf/k)t-1* BUSI,  (Credit/k)t-1* BUSI, (cf/k)t-2* BUSI,  
(Credit/k)t-2* BUSI.  Qt-1, Qt-2 and (s/k)t-1, (s/k)t-2 are used for the Q and Euler models respectively. 
 
 
  
 
